This study tests whether psychological attachment to a political party influences voluntary participation in a government-promoted public-good scheme, positing that cooperation is higher among households that identify with the party in government and lower among households that identify with the party in opposition. The focus is participation in a voluntary recycling scheme, in the context of a European country (Malta) where two parties dominate the political landscape. A nationally-representative survey (n = 1,037), yielded information on recycling participation rates and on environmental and political preferences. The survey was conducted shortly after a change in government and also gauged intent to participate in a new scheme with a split-sample manipulation in which the treatment group received a political prime. The results indicate that the initial uptake of the scheme launched by a Nationalist government was significantly lower among respondents close to the Labour Party. Five years later this effect had decayed. But intent to participate in the hypothetical scheme was lower among respondents close to the party in opposition (this time, the Nationalist Party), if primed with a cue that associates the new scheme with the Labour party. Formal modeling of scheme participation and intent (controlling for political and environmental ideology inter alia), yielded consistent results. These findings shed light on a new dimension which may be responsible for diverse rates of uptake of a public good schemes with practical implications for scheme promotion.
Introduction
This study investigates the relationship between partisanship and the willingness of households to voluntarily contribute to public goods. More specifically, it examines whether closely identifying with a political party stimulates contribution to a government-promoted voluntary recycling scheme, if that party is in government, and dampens it, if that party is in opposition.
The need to examine how partisanship effects behaviour (beyond voting) has been flagged in recent contributions (Gerber and Huber 2010; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Sunstein 2014) , and the question remains underexplored in recycling specifically, and public goods more generally.
Although a handful of studies on pro-environmental behaviour do consider the roles of political vote, ideology or political interest (Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007; Costa and Kahn 2013; Dupont and Bateman 2012; Coffey and Joseph 2013; McBeth, et al 2013; Briguglio, et al 2015, ) , there appear to be none which parse out party identification as a distinct determinant of voluntary cooperation. Party identification is a form of psychological attachment to a party, often acquired quite early in life and typically manifesting itself in stable voting preferences, and which may strengthened by the screening out of threatening information (Marsh 2006) . It is a type of social identity (Campbell, et al 1960; Lewis-Beck, et al 2008) , considered to be more stable and less cognitive than political interest or ideology (Campbell, et al 1960) . The term "negative partisans" has been used to describe those who feel strongly against the party in government (Crewe 1976) . The premise in this paper is that, aside from their ideological preferences, individuals may feel sufficiently attached to the party in government to derive satisfaction from contributing to public goods promoted by that party, or attached enough to the party in opposition to act in defiance of government's efforts.
The study employs a rich data set drawn from a dedicated nationally-representative telephone survey (n = 1,037), carried out in a European context (Malta), where two dominant parties characterise the political landscape, and where a change in government had recently occurred. Data on recycling behaviour and intent, on scheme attributes, and on environmental and political preferences, made it possible to formally investigate the relationship between political attachment and participation, while controlling for other determinants. The survey also gauged intent to participate in a new scheme (under a new government) with a split-sample manipulation, in which the treatment group received a political prime, namely a piece of information which allowed them to infer an association between the scheme with the new government, without providing more detailed knowledge.
1 Although priming experiments have gained momentum (Lenz 2009; McDermott 2002) , applications in the field of recycling are still limited (Croson and Treich 2014) .
Literature Review

Household cooperation in public-good schemes
1 In this study, we refer to this treatment as a prime. We recognize that there are inconsistencies across disciplines in the use of the term "prime" versus "frame", and that these terms are sometimes used interchangeably (See Druckman et al. 2009 for a discussion).
Within the broad literature on household cooperation in public-good schemes, recycling participation has drawn considerable scholarly attention. This not only reflects policy-makers' concern with ever increasing volumes of household waste and its associated environmental impacts (Briguglio 2016; OECD 2008) , but also the availability of rich data, capable of offering valuable lessons for other public-good domains (Kinnaman and Takeuchi 2014) . Much like behaviour in other public-good domains, recycling requires households to utilise private resources, but its benefits (such as the diversion of waste from landfill and reduction of harmful emissions) are public, enjoyed collectively by all members of society (Briguglio 2016) . In scenarios like this, economic models built on the assumption of purely self-interested agents predict little voluntary contribution -such agents would opt to free-ride on the efforts of others (Baumol and Oates 1988) . Intervention is therefore considered necessary to tip the cost-benefit trade-off to favour participation (Hahn 1989) . In turn, much of the literature has focused on the role of fees to discourage mixed waste disposal (Fullerton, et al 2010) and, increasingly, of convenience to relieve the time and space required to separate waste (Jenkins, et al 2003; Sidique, et al 2010; Lange, et al 2014) .
In economic studies on waste, households are often modelled as constrained utilitymaximisers: Their members give up leisure-time and space to separate waste for recycling and weigh the cost of doing so against the benefits derived from participating. Recent work has given greater attention to the role of moral preferences that household members may hold, as drivers of participation. The process of cooperation in public-good schemes allows household members to fulfil moral preferences and generates a private so-called "warm-glow" benefit (Andreoni 1990) , or suppresses the guilt of not cooperating (Brekke, et al 2003) . A review of empirical studies concludes that such motives may indeed be important determinants (Kinnaman 2006) , large enough to stimulate voluntary recycling even if this involves private costs (Briguglio, et al 2015; Czajkowski, et al 2014; Abbott, et al 2013; Halvorsen 2008) .
Insights from environmental psychology further suggest that, underpinning such motives, are important priors like awareness of consequences, belief in the efficacy of action and ascription of responsibility (Schwartz 1977; Biel and Thøgersen 2007) . Recycling participation is, in fact, generally found to increase with knowledge or awareness (Jenkins, et al 2003) and educational effort (Sidique, et al 2010) , although communication campaigns which fail to contribute to recycling effort are also documented (Valle, et al 2005) .
The role of political preferences and cues
In applied work, moral motives are often proxied by some measure of environmental attitude or behaviour (Viscusi, et al 2011; Halvorsen 2008; Abbott, et al 2013; Czajkowski, et al 2014; Brekke, et al 2003; Hage, et al 2009; Bruvoll and Nyborg 2004) . Vote or political affiliation data have been used as proxies for environmental motives, but the results are mixed:
Recycling is found to be higher among Green Party supporters in Sweden (Hage and Söderholm 2008) and among non-voters (possibly in protest against waste fees) in Norway (Halvorsen 2008) . The vote variable has also often found to be an insignificant determinant (Brekke, et al 2010; Coffey and Joseph 2013; McBeth, et al 2013) , but Brekke and his colleagues have argued that ignoring its effect could lead to exaggerated predictions of other moral effects (Brekke, et al 2010) . The broader environmental economics literature reveals a relationship between political and environmental preferences, namely that ideologically leftwing supporters tend to have stronger pro-environmental preferences (Dupont and Bateman 2012) , being willing to pay higher financial contributions to environmental organisations (Neumayer 2004) , and demonstrating stronger support for environmental taxes (Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007) . Higher political interest also correlates with stronger environmental concern (Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007; Wakefield, et al 2006) .
Political preferences can be activated by communication cues, yielding diverse cooperative outcomes. In a US-based study, the way recycling benefits were framed interacted with respondent ideology to influence intent to recycle (McBeth, et al 2013) . Furthermore
Democrats and Liberals recycled more than Conservatives and Republicans, but only if these showed strong interest in political news (Coffey and Joseph 2013) . Diverse outcomes were again observed among Liberals and Conservatives, in response to an energy conservation nudge (Costa and Kahn 2013) . In the US again, suitable framing of the Affordable Care Act (emphasizing the role of the private sector) narrows the partisan gap in uptake between
Republicans and Democrats (Lerman et al 2017) . Voting outcomes and promotional effort also significantly explained regional variation in the uptake of a voluntary recycling scheme in Malta (Briguglio, et al 2015) .
These findings chime with the literature from economic psychology which suggests that, in a world where decision-makers have limited capacities to assess all aspects, communication can make one dimension more salient than others, and influence decision outcomes, in different ways among different audiences (Glaeser 2014; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Tversky and Kahneman 1986) . Hence, in determining cooperation in public-good schemes, there is scope not only for investigating the role of political preferences per se (Dupont and Bateman 2012) , but also of how these interact with communication cues (Costa and Kahn 2013; Schultz, et al 2007; Bolsen, et al 2014; McBeth, et al 2013) . Such considerations may be particularly relevant at the time of initial rollout of a public-good scheme, for this is when public communication is most intense (Graber and Smith 2005; John 2013 ) and when political cues are likely to be present. Though these may be ignored by some households, they may be picked up by those with strong political preferences (Graber and Smith 2005) . identify the kind of factors (such as explicit inducements to form an accurate opinion, and bipartisan support for the law) that can condition such partisanmotivated reasoning .
A question which remains unexplored is whether political attachment is a political preference worthy of examination. A number of theoretical insights converge to suggest so.
Firstly, partisanship may shape perceptions about policy and provide a lens through which to assess decisions (Campbell, et al 1960) . Whether as tendency to blindly follow the "tribe", or as a reasonable act of taking of cues from a party that shares one's interest (Lenz 2009 ), those who feel attached to the party promoting a scheme may be more receptive to it, relying on narratives from trusted political sources to simplify complex scientific information (McBeth, et al 2013) . By corollary, those who closely identify with the party in opposition may view the intervention (proposed by the government) with prejudice. This type of sentiment (among conservatives, of liberals), has been touted as an obstacle to climate regulation in the United
States (Sunstein 2014) . Secondly, as party identification is also linked with identification with fellow party supporters (Green, et al 2004) , a sense of "togetherness", (Heyman and Ariely 2004; Ahn, et al 2010) , may also work in favour of participation when government, led by one's own party, is promoting it. In contrast, the pleasure of spite may motivate those who identify strongly with the party in opposition (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009) . Finally, simple selfinterest may be the mechanism that drives both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior among partisans, in a bipolar political scenario, for cooperating with government, increases the chances of the incumbent winning the next election, and reduces the odds of the party in opposition. Such factional loyalty can be particularly tense around elections (Boissevain 1993 ).
Synthesis and Hypotheses
In synthesis then, the literature finds that recycling participation to be driven by warmglow benefits, and these benefits are typically considered to stem from the fulfilment of environmental preferences. But it is also plausible that such benefits (and costs) derive from the fulfilment of political preferences and that such preferences can be activated by political cues. The question which this study asks is precisely whether linking a public-good scheme to the party in government, creates diverse behavioural outcomes, depending on whether households are positively attached to the party in government to the party in opposition, or to no party in particular. To this end, we set out to test three hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The uptake of a public-good scheme is positive in attachment to the party in government (for example, uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is higher among households attached to the Nationalist party).
Hypothesis 2: The uptake of a public-good scheme is negative in attachment to the party in opposition (for example, uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is lower among households attached to the Labour party).
Hypothesis 3: Support for a scheme becomes more partisan, the stronger the links between the scheme and the party in government (for example during scheme promotion and in the presence of cues that link a scheme to the party).
Context and Survey
Context
The role of political attachment is likely to be more strongly felt in contexts where preferences are polarised, where political parties have a strong presence in governance (Katz 1987) , and where competition between parties is not based on (obvious) ideological differences (Marsh 2006 introduced, and promoted, a door-to-door recycling-waste collection scheme. The scheme would offer collection of dry recycling waste, at least once a week, in special grey bags. These could be purchased for a small fee, though some were provided for free. Households could also discard recycling waste in unmanned waste receptors in each locality. Mixed municipal waste collection continued to be offered door-to-door, almost daily, without quantity restrictions and free of charge. Despite the lack of incentive and the nuisance of separating and storing recycling waste, uptake was positive (Briguglio, et al 2015) . It continued to increase when the scheme was delegated from the Ministry to Local Councils, and later to private operators (National Statistics Office Malta 2013). 
Sample generation
Data for the study was drawn from a nationally-representative survey conducted by a team of trained enumerators. Computer Assisted Telephone Surveys were used to avoid biasing responses towards literate respondents and avid recyclers, a problem that is typical of self-administered surveys (Hage, et al 2009) . A face-to-face mechanism would have limited sample size, given budgetary constraints. The sampling frame was generated from the Maltese electoral register.
To ensure that households had an equal probability of being captured (no matter their size) household members were aggregated, then randomly sampled, with up to four replacements, from natural next-row choice (to cater for drop-outs). Telephone numbers were matched using on-line directories. Interviews were then conducted with the household member answering the telephone, provided they confirmed that they were aged 18 years or over. A total of 1,037 responses were generated in this way. Figure 2 indicates that the regional distribution of these households was highly representative of that of the whole population of Maltese households (which totals 142,310). A comparison of the sampled household characteristics with those of national data (National Statistics Office 2012a) also indicates very similar characteristics (described in 3.5 below). Telephone respondents were, however, more likely to be female, which explains why the sample is female-skewed relative to the Maltese population.
Figure 2 Distribution of households by region in sample, population
Survey instrument
The interview itself was developed after an extensive review of recycling studies and following interviews with waste separation operators and regulators to identify the actual scheme attributes. Pan-European surveys (including the European Social Survey and Eurobarometer) were reviewed for comparable questions on politics and the Maltese Census was used as a reference for wording on demographic questions. Following clearance by the Ethics Committee at the University of Stirling, a pen-and-paper pilot study was conducted in October 2012 (n = 100). The syntax was kept very simple, any unfamiliar terms were defined and scales were kept similar between questions, with ranges specifying exact frequencies (Tourangeau, et al 2000) . The interview was professionally translated into the Maltese language and programmed into Qualtrics software to allow use of randomisation options and to reduce inputting error.
The first set of questions yielded data on household characteristics and constraints, including household size, composition, dwelling type and locality. The second set of questions required respondents to describe the recycling scheme in operation in their locality (collection frequency, price, types of waste, information sources) as perceived by households (Valle, et al 2005) . In the third section, respondents were asked if their household separated waste for door- 
Experiment design
While the survey generated data on actual participation, an embedded experiment was designed to examine intent to participate in a scheme and the effect of a political prime associating this with the new government. The study described a hypothetical recycling scheme and randomised respondents (equally) into one of two conditions. In the treatment condition, ahead of the description of the scheme, respondents were told "The Labour Party is now in government". In the control condition respondents received no such statement. 
The Sample
As indicated in Figure 2 , the sample was regionally representative. Sample respondents also report the same mean household size as the national population (2.9) and a gross income 
Analysis 4.1 Hypotheses
This data-set makes it possible to empirically test whether the likelihood of participation (actual and intended) in a government-promoted recycling scheme is higher among households with strong positive attachment towards the party in government and lower among households with strong positive attachment to the party in opposition.
More specifically, we set out to test whether uptake of a public-good scheme is positive in attachment to the party in government (Hypothesis 1). We do this by testing H1a: Uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is higher among households attached to the Nationalist party; and H1b: Intent to take up a hypothetical scheme launched by the Labour Party is higher among households attached to the Labour party. We also test whether uptake of a public-good scheme is negative in attachment to the party in opposition (Hypothesis 2). We do this by testing H2a: Uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is lower among households attached to the Labour party; and H2b: Intent to take up a hypothetical scheme launched by the Labour Party is lower among households attached to the Nationalist party.
Finally, we examine whether the effect of political attachment is positive in links associating the scheme with the party in government (Hypothesis 3). We do this by testing: H3a. The effect of political attachment on uptake intent is stronger when respondents are primed with a political statement; and H3b: The effect of political attachment decays with distance from scheme promotion. To test each of these hypotheses we start by examining simple differences in means.
Analysis of differences in means
As can be seen in Figure 3 , the data reveals that mean recycling participation doubled To test Hypothesis 1, we first look at the mean rates of uptake of the scheme launched We conclude that uptake of a public-good scheme may be is negative in attachment to the party in opposition.
To test Hypothesis 3, we exploit the randomisation of the prime/no-prime treatment with a political cue that associates the public-good scheme with the Labour party. We find that administering a prime among the Labour attached ("closer to", "very close to" or "voted for" 
Formal analysis
In order to test whether these findings survive ceteris paribus conditions, we now set about a more formal analysis of the role of political attachment. Drawing upon the conceptual framework outlined in Section 2, and following others in the field (e.g. Briguglio et. al 2015,
Callan and Thomas 1997, Hage and Soderholm 2008) we specify the likelihood of participation in a recycling scheme as a function of household constraints, scheme attributes, environmental preferences and demographic controls. We add partisan preferences, whose effect we are interested in testing, as per Model 1: Yi = α + β1Gi + β2Ci + β3Ei + β5Di + β5Pi + ui Model 1
Where i indexes households;
Yi is the likelihood of waste separation by household i;
Gi is a vector of scheme attributes enjoyed by household i
Ci is a vector of constraints faced by household i, including income, time and space;
Ei is a vector describing household i's pro-environmental and ideological preferences;
Di is a vector of demographic controls
Pi is a vector describing household i's partisan preferences ui represents the error term.
Within this framework, and in line with the findings of the literature, we expect the chances of observing recycling (Y) to be lower among households with higher constraints (C), higher among those with pro-environmental preferences (E) and higher among those enjoying favourable scheme attributes (G). The main test of interest is whether the likelihood of uptake (Y) is higher among households with strong positive attachment towards the party in government, and lower among households with strong positive attachment to the party in opposition, even after controlling for ideology and political interest. In estimating the model with intent to participate as the outcome variable, we include recycling experience as an important control variable (Knussen and Yule 2008 ). Here we are also able to test how a political prime interacts with partisan preferences, anticipating higher intent among primed households with strong positive attachment towards the party in government and lower intent among primed households with strong positive attachment to the party in opposition. captures the extent to which the household uses alternative recycling disposal facilities, which theoretically could compete with participation in the kerb-side scheme (Beatty, et al 2007) .
The vector of household constraints (C) is represented by the variables SPACE, SINGLE and WASTE, the first indicating whether the residence has a garden or not, the second identifying households with only one resident (as a measure of adult time available for recycling), the third indicating kilograms of waste generated as estimated by the survey respondent, which we consider exogenous. Pro-environmental sentiment (E) is captured by two variables PRO-ENV and EFFICACY, both on a 0 to 10 scale, indicating the respondents' agreement with the relevant statements. Other control variables include FEMALE, AGE and EDUC which capture the respondent's gender, age and educational levels respectively. YEARS is a control variable, useful in analysis of intent and measuring years of recycling to date. Table 2 reports the determinants of uptake at the start of the scheme introduced and promoted by Nationalist government, (UPTAKE) as the dependent variable. Given that the dependent variables are binary, and that Ordinary Least Squares estimation can run into the problem of generating predictions that are not bound between zero and one, we employ a Probit link function to estimate the models for uptake and participation. Here, the inverse standard normal distribution of the probability (of uptake) is modelled as a linear combination of the predictors. In Table 2 we report the marginal effects, that is the increase in probability attributed to a one-unit increase in each of the predictors for an average individual (dy/dx). The table also includes the standard errors of the individual coefficients, and the main fit-statistics.
Ahead of interpreting the results, it bears emphasis here that the predicted variable in that towards the Labour party) which constitutes a significant (and negative) determinant. The computed marginal effects suggest that when respondents admitted to being "Closer to" to the Labour party, the probability of uptake of the scheme was reduced by 7 percent, even after controlling for other drivers (including environmental morality) and constraints. But being closer to the nationalist party does not constitute a significant determinant. The results remained stable when the model was estimated using LOGIT, REG and VCE (ROBUST) commands.
3 Table 3 Determinants of recycling participation
In Table 3 , the same process is repeated, this time with eventual participation (PARTICIPATES) in an established scheme as the depenedent variable. Once again, the first 3 We also estimate a model with years of participation in the kerbside scheme as the dependent variable. We again confirm that being close to the Labour Party delays uptake of a scheme run under a Nationalist government. The coefficient here is 0.522 (significant at the 5 % level) suggesting that attachment to the Labour Party creates a 6 month delay, ceteris paribus. 
Table 4 Determinants of recycling intent
Finally, Table 4 summarises the determinants of participation intent (INTENT) in a hypothetical recycling scheme, employing the data generated by the embedded experiment. It is worth recalling, at this stage, that the scheme is identical to the current scheme in every way, except that the scheme incentivises recycling by having residents pay a nominal fee to dispose of remaining (unseparated) waste. Few respondents admitted to having no intent to participate in this scheme, limiting the variation in the dependent variable. Nonetheless, we start by estimating INTENT to participate in a hypothetical scheme as a simple function of years of participation in the current scheme, on the premise that hypothetical kerbside recycling scheme is determined by experience in recycling (Knussen and Yule 2008) . We control only for the difference in attributes between the current and the new scheme (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997) as well as basic respondent demographics (Model a). We note that both experience with recycling and the provision of free recycling bags in the current scheme positively effect intent to participate in a scheme where recycling will effectively be subsidised. We then include VOTE as an explanatory variable, but find that this adds no predictive power (Model b). We proceed to replace VOTE by incorporating IDEOLOGY, INTEREST and ATTACHMENT (Model c), and find, again, no further explanatory power on the intent to participate in the scheme. Next, we control for the effect of the prime and its interaction with political attachment. Model d is fitted with STATA's regress command, given that the estimation of the magnitude, sign and statistical significance of interaction effects in nonlinear models is problematic (Ai and Norton 2003) . 4 Now find that being politically-attached to the Nationalist Party and being reminded that the Labour Party is in government may suppresses intent to participate. Once again, however, it is, if anything, those who declare themselves to be close to the party in opposition whose intent is influenced (negatively), and not those who declare themselves closer to the party in government.
By way of summary, the results show that attachment to the Labour Party in opposition, was a significant, negative determinant of initial uptake of the Nationalist government scheme.
There is also evidence that attachment with the Nationalist party in opposition interacts with a 4 A comparison of the outcomes with a Probit estimation corrected for the magnitude of interaction effect using the "inteff" command (Norton, et al 2004) , shows consistent results: the interaction of the prime with attachment to the party in opposition suppressed uptake.
partisan cue to suppress intent to participate in a hypothetical scheme under a Labour government. Neither attachment to the Nationalist Party nor attachment to the Labour Party were significant determinants of eventual participation in an established scheme. Reverting back to the original hypotheses, we can, once again, safely reject Hypothesis 1: Uptake at the launch of a government promoted scheme uptake is no higher among households attached to the party in government, whether in the context of an actual scheme (H1a) or of a hypothetical scheme (H1b). Once again, we do not reject Hypothesis 2: Uptake is lower among households attached to the party in opposition in the context of an actual scheme launched by the Nationalist Party (H2a) and in the context of a hypothetical scheme launched by the Labour party (H2b). We again confirm that the effect of partisan attachment on intent is significant only in the presence of a partisan cue in the scheme's promotion and only among negative partisans (H3a). Moreover, the effect of partisan attachment decays over time and other determinants gain importance (H3b).
Discussion
A review of the main shortcomings of this study, and of the efforts made to mitigate them, will draw attention to the importance of further academic scrutiny on the question of the role of political attachment in determining uptake of public-good schemes. Although direct observation of household recycling is difficult and may influence behaviour itself (Brekke, et al 2010) , an obvious concern with research such as this, is the reliance on self-reported behaviour which can be biased towards higher recycling reports. The use of telephone interviews (as opposed to self-administered postal/web surveys) addressed some concern with selection bias. The insertion of face-saving questions, appeals to honesty, assurance of confidentially and anonymity (enumerators themselves did not know whom they were calling), and invitations to report behaviour in specific periods, were all intended to eliminate strategic responses. The resulting data were both internally consistent and closely comparable with national data.
A specific shortcoming of the data on initial uptake, was reliance on recall. In this regard, the results of the formal analysis of uptake (Table 2 ) merit particular caution, even if they do replicate those from a study which employed administrative data in the same context (Briguglio, et al 2015) . A similar issue lay in relying on stated intent for future uptake, which implicitly rests on the assumption that intent is an antecedent to behaviour (Ajzen 1991) , or at least, that the intent-behaviour bias is evenly spread. Lack of sincerity, poor forecasting (Tourangeau, et al 2000) and lack of control over other household members (Boldero 1995) could introduce unobserved heterogeneity among the respondents. To mitigate other errors, and in line with best practice, respondents were given the opportunity to reflect not only upon their current behaviour but also on other waste disposal options before being asked to consider future recycling behaviour (Arrow, et al 1993) . They were offered a realistic scenario with a significant likelihood of being implemented (Poe and Vossler 2011) , and were, reasonably, asked to predict their behaviour over the coming weeks. It was also fortunate, that in most instances, respondents stated that they were the household member responsible for waste.
Future research that observes (rather that relies on recall or intent) the same individuals over time would mitigate some of these shortcomings.
In the experimental component, we took care to meet the criteria for sound design and analysis (Gaines, et al 2007) . We employed a very simple treatment in stripped-down settings with no deception and no cash reward (McDermott 2002) . A legitimate question is whether the prime represented the kind of cue respondents may receive in real-life scenarios, or whether this was a relatively stronger stimulus, given that survey respondents are a captive audience (Luskin, et al 2002; Druckman and Nelson 2003) . To mitigate this, the prime administered was very subtle and only implicitly politicised the scheme. It was free of the political posturing and repetition, which may occur in real life. Indeed, if anything, real-life stimuli could be stronger.
Another oft-made consideration is whether the prime induces respondent learning (Lenz 2009 ).
This is hardly likely to have been the case, given that the prime only mentioned that the Labour party was in government. With a 93 per cent voting turnout in the election held a few months earlier, it is unlikely that any of the respondents did not already know that. In fact, one problem with the treatment is that have been that the perception of the control (un-primed) group may not have been sufficiently different from that of the primed group. Together, these considerations suggest that the results in the intent scenario may actually be lower-bound estimates. Future research that tests the effects on cooperation of administering stronger cues on partisan preferences could develop these findings further.
Other issues with the formal estimation methods are common to the techniques employed, but bear mention for the sake of completeness. In specifying a formal model, there is a risk of omitted variables, which can result in biased variable coefficients or errors. The specification of the models employed here, based on a conceptual framework of utility maximisation under constraints, included variables typically employed in recycling models within the limitations posed by over-specification. In fitting the models with a standard probit model, we also assumed homoskedasticity of the errors in the latent-variable model. To address possible problems with this assumption we also compute robust standard errors and reestimated the models using Logit and Ordinary Least Squares techniques. The results survived these tests. The fact that the results on the other, more established determinants of recycling cooperation (namely household constraints, enabling scheme attributes and pro-envrionmental motives) support those in the environmental economics literature (Briguglio 2016), lends greater confidence to the more novel findings of our study, namely those pertaining to partisanship.
Conclusion
The findings in this study contribute new theoretical insights on the question that the study set out to examine, namely, whether political attachment is a significant determinant of participation in public-good scheme. Attachment to the party in opposition emerges as having a significant and negative influence on likelihood of participation in a government scheme, responding to cues that associate the scheme with the party in government. Such association does not seem enhance uptake among those who are attached to the party in government, and decays over time. This asymmetry reflects that which is observed when political ideology interacts with framing (McBeth, et al 2013; Costa and Kahn 2013) , or with news interest (Coffey and Joseph 2013) , and when vote interacts with promotional effort (Briguglio, et al 2015) .
In some ways the results are unsurprising, echoing the observed phenomenon that the way economic performance is perceived, depends on voters' partisan allegiance and the party in power (Schwartz 2017) , and reflecting conventional wisdom that favorability towards a policy becomes more partisan the stronger its link with a particular party. Yet these findings provide some direct evidence that partisan allegiance can actually affect participation in a public programme. Indeed, the findings offer an important insight for promoting such publicgood schemes, in order to avoid creating unnecessary barriers. Strength of (negative) feeling towards politicians occurs well beyond the shores of Malta (Bartle and Bellucci 2009) , not only in other, strongly bi-polar, two-party political systems (like the United Kingdom, USA, and Spain) but also in polarised multi-party or cadre party systems. In such contexts, governments wishing to encourage voluntary cooperation would do well to avoid partisan messages, or messengers, when promoting a scheme. Delaying political point-scoring to a later point (once the scheme is taken up) could be one way to of limiting harmful impacts.
Voluntary contribution in public-good schemes is a phenomenon that is attracting increasing interest in economic literature (Guttman and Goette 2015, Guttman 2013 
